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While social movement research has taken a strong interest in 
disruptive and violent protest tactics, they have so far played a 
marginal role in the growing body of literature on the fair trade 
movement. This article takes up Frank Trentmann’s suggestion 
of ‘widening the historical frame’ in which we analyse the fair 
trade movement.1 As Trentmann’s thought-provoking analysis 
of moral food economies in the modern world has shown, 
ethical consumerism was not only used to improve the working 
and living conditions of plantation workers and other producers 
in the Global South but also to promote empire goods in 
interwar-Britain.2 This article uses a similarly broad approach 
to analyse the role of violence in solidarity movements with 
producers in the Global South. More specifically, it explores 
the entangled history of violent and peaceful tactics in two 
transnational solidarity campaigns in West Germany the 1980s. 
Although there have always been debates about the ways in 
which business can or should contribute to the rest of society, 
these discussions have reached a new level of intensity in 
response to the rapid economic globalization in the 1980s. 
According to Michael Blowfield and Alan Murrey, this period 
saw the rise of corporate responsibility as a means for 
addressing the ‘unprecedented private sector wealth, power, 
and impact’ on a global scale.3 There are many different 
definitions of corporate responsibility, but most emphasise that 
companies need to take responsibility for their social and 
environmental impact even if they are not legally obliged to do 
so.4 Media reports and first-hand testimonies about the abuse of 
workers in global supply chains in the 1970s and 1980s sparked 
protest movements in Western Europe that sought to improve 
the living and working conditions of producers in the Global 
South. While the strategies employed by these movements 
included initiatives to help marginalised small producers in the 
Global South by selling their produce in fair trade shops in 
Europe, there were also radical and violent protest activities 
that is rarely mentioned in the literature on consumer activism.5      
A growing body of research at the nexus of organizational 
theory and social movement studies examines how protest 
movements have tried to challenge companies and their trade 
practices, and how organizations have responded to this 
challenge.6 While the use of corporate boycotts and other extra-
institutional tactics in  campaigns7 for social justice and better 
working conditions have been studied in a range of political 
contexts, the role of violent tactics in such campaigns and the 
ways in which the targeted companies have responded to 
violent protest have so far attracted relatively little attention. 
Based on two case studies, this article explores the following 
questions: (1) how are violent protest tactics discussed in 
transnational solidarity campaigns for workers in the Global 
South? (2) Can they contribute towards achieving the 
objectives of such campaigns? Although the two campaigns 
cannot provide clear-cut answers to these questions, they can 
offer critical insights into the economic and political impact of 
violent protest.             
The two protest movements discussed in this article are the 
German anti-Apartheid campaign, which was part of a world-
wide protest movement against the South African Apartheid 
regime, and a solidarity campaign with South Korean women 
workers, who were producing clothes for the German clothing 
chain Adler. Both campaigns took place in the 1980s and had 
the aim to challenge corporate practices and to improve the 
working and living conditions of producers in the Global South. 
While this aim was shared by activists in the growing fair trade 
movement, the two protest movements discussed here focused 
on products that were not available in the 200 fair trade shops 
(‘Eine Welt Läden) in West Germany (e.g. oranges, everyday 
clothing, and cars).8 Both campaigns mobilised a range of 
groups including Christian organizations, trade unions, 
feminists, Third World activists9, and radical leftist groups. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the protest tactics 
employed in both campaigns ranged from posters, flyers and 
other public appeals, boycott and demonstrations to bombings 
and other attacks against the property of the alleged profiteers 
of the exploitation of workers in the Global South.  
It is important to highlight that there was no consensus on the 
use of violent protest tactics in either of the two campaigns. In 
both cases, bombings, arson attacks and other acts of property 
damage were carried out by relatively small groups of people 
who did not seek the approval of other activists, and they were 
met with strong opposition in parts of the solidarity campaigns.  
Although ‘there has been considerable disagreement over 
whether disruptive or violent movements are more successful 
than those that are less contentious’, recent research in 
organizational theory suggests that companies feel compelled 
to respond to protest movements if they consider campaigns to 
pose a substantial threat to their reputation and/or business 
interests.10 According to Joseph Luders, firms weigh the effects 
of accepting or resisting change demanded by protesters based 
on an assessment of disruption and concession costs. In this 
context, disruption costs refer to the losses ‘resulting directly 
and indirectly from movement actions’, e.g. as the result of 
demonstrations, boycotts, and negative publicity, while 
concession costs occur because of measures to meet the 
demands of protest movements.11 Luders’ economic 
opportunity structure suggests that companies are likely to 
accept change if they consider the disruption costs high and the 
concession costs low, but it is considerably less likely that they 
respond in this way if the concession costs seem high. If 
confronted with high concession costs, firms tend to respond 
with minor concessions and/or protracted negotiations (if the 
disruption costs are high), or ‘offer durable opposition’ to the 
protest movements (if the disruption costs are low).12 This 
article will use Luders’ model to analyse the ways in which 
companies have responded to violent protest. Having invested 
large sums of money in lucrative production sites in South 
Africa and South Korea, the German companies targeted by the 
two protest movements faced high concession costs and were 
reluctant to concede to movement demands. As the article 
shows, their responses to the two campaigns depended not only 
on the protest tactics employed but also on media coverage and 
the broader political context.  
A transnational campaign against trade with the South 
African Apartheid regime 
As a heavily export-oriented economy, the South African 
Apartheid regime had a keen interest in trade relations with the 
FRG and other countries in the Global North. As early as 1959, 
the prominent South African teacher, spokesperson of the 
‘African National Congress’ (ANC), anti-Apartheid activist, 
and future Nobel Prize winner Albert Lutuli called for a 
worldwide boycott of South African goods. In the same year, 
activists in Britain responded to this call with the formation of 
the ‘Boycott Movement’, which was renamed ‘Anti-Apartheid 
Movement’ [AAM] one year later.13 Calls for a cultural boycott 
of South Africa can be traced back even further in history. In 
1956, Equity, the trade union for creative practitioners called 
for a boycott of all South African theatres that were adhering to 
the government’s racial segregation policy.14 Soon, many 
musicians and writers in Britain joined the cultural boycott, and 
prominent musicians like the Beatles or the Rolling Stones 
refused to perform in South Africa.15 Although the public 
interest in the situation in South Africa waned in the UK in the 
course of the 1960s, South-African activist Peter Hain’s 
successful ‘Stop the Seventy Tour’ campaign against a South 
African cricket tour brought it back into the spotlight.16 The 
AAM was never able to persuade governments to demand 
mandatory economic sanctions, but there can be no doubt that 
the boycotts helped to keep the Apartheid issue on the political 
agenda in Britain and many other countries.17 
Like in Britain, where ‘opposing apartheid meant very different 
things for different people and served very different purposes’, 
the West German anti-Apartheid movement was extremely 
diverse and involved Church groups, humanitarian 
organizations, and anti-imperialist groups.18 Among the first to 
mobilise against the Apartheid regime were Black South 
African students in West Germany and Protestant ministers and 
other Church members from Germany, who had first-hand 
experience of the situation in South Africa. Quinn Slobodian 
has traced expressions of solidarity with activists from the 
Global South in the German student movement back to the 
early 1960s.19 In 1963, the South African academic and anti-
Apartheid activist Neville Alexander was arrested after 
returning from a research stay in West Germany. In response to 
his arrest, exiled South African students and German activists 
raised 40,000 Deutschmark (DM) for his legal defence and call 
for an end of political ties and business relations with the 
Apartheid regime.20 In 1964, Latin American, Haitian, and 
Ethiopian students in West Germany set up an ‘international 
working group’ with German student activists in which they 
discussed anti-colonial struggles and revolutionary theories 
from the Global South.21   
Despite this and other campaigns in the 1960s, South African 
exiles found that most West German University students had 
little or no knowledge of the political situation in South Africa 
and many other countries in the Global South. When the artist 
Gavin Jantjes came to Hamburg on a German scholarship in 
1970, he found his fellow students ‘pretty dull’. In an interview 
from 2016, Jantjes recalled that the young people he met 
‘didn’t know anything about the world. This was a time 
political protest against the Vietnam War and I mentioned 
South Africa and Apartheid they didn’t even know where South 
Africa was’.22 While Jantjes’s fellow students tried to enthuse 
him for the work of Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse and other 
revolutionary thinkers, he used his art to raise awareness for the 
situation of Black and Coloured South Africans and tried to 
mobilise fellow students and other people in West Germany 
against the Apartheid regime. 
When collecting material for his screenprint series South 
African Colouring Book in the early 1970s, Jantjes established 
contact with ANC members in East Berlin and promised them 
to do what he could to support their struggle.23 Unlike in the 
German Democratic Republic, the ANC was a banned 
organization in West Germany, and the activities of Jantjes and 
other South African exiles with links to the ANC were 
monitored closely by German and South African security 
services. Nevertheless, Jantjes joined forces with other 
dissidents and looked at the possibility of starting a West 
German anti-Apartheid group. Soon after being granted 
political asylum in West Germany in 1973, he joined the ‘Anti 
Apartheid Bewegung’ [Anti-Apartheid Movement, short AAB] 
Germany. 
Founded in April 1974 by the progressive Christian group 
‘Mainzer Arbeitskreis Südliches Afrika’ [Mainz working group 
Southern Africa] and representatives from a range of 
organizations, including the ANC and anti-Apartheid groups in 
the UK and in the Netherlands, the AAB had one single 
objective: to end of all forms of collaboration between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the racist regime in South 
Africa.24 The AAB was campaigning for the release of political 
prisoners and called for an immediate end to South African 
state visits to Germany, as well as military cooperation, and 
other forms of collaboration with the Apartheid regime. The 
group’s activities ranged from petitions, public letters and 
lawsuits against alleged profiteers from trade with the 
Apartheid regime to creative protest actions and boycott 
campaigns. Whilst working with the ANC and other militant 
groups in Southern Africa, the AAB limited itself to peaceful 
and constitutional means of protest. The members of the 
organization were divided on the question of how the AAB 
should relate to armed liberation struggles in Southern Africa. 
In the  mid-1970s, Jantjes, the only Black South African board 
member of the AAB, urged the organization to show solidarity 
with armed ANC rebels. Other members, however, rejected this 
stance as ‘anti-imperialist dogma’.25 The use of violence by 
South African anti-Apartheid activists continued to be a matter 
of controversy into the 1980s. 
The first major boycott campaign against South African 
produce in West Germany was inspired by a successful 
example from the Netherlands. In 1972 and 1973 respectively, 
a group of Dutch anti-Apartheid activists had organized an 
educational campaign about and large-scale boycott against 
South African Outspan oranges. In 1972, the group released a 
booklet with the title ‘Outspan: Bouwstenen voor apartheid’ 
(Outspan: Building Bricks for Apartheid). As former group 
member Essau du Plessis26 explains, the title referred to the 
South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster’s 
statement ‘Every time a South African product is bought, it is 
another brick in the wall of our continued existence.’27  
In the early 1970s, South African authorities had initiated a 
carefully planned promotion campaign to boost sales of South 
African citrus fruit in Western Europe: they sent a group of 
white South African ‘Outspan Girls’ on a tour through 
European supermarkets to attract new customers in this key 
market area. In the Netherlands, an ethnically diverse group of 
activists who called themselves ‘Inspan Girls’ (Harness Girls) 
followed the Outspan Girls on their tour through supermarkets 
and sales fairs. Together with other opponents of Apartheid, the 
Inspan Girls tried to educate consumers about the political 
situation in South Africa and promoted a boycott Outspan 
oranges and other South African produce.  
At its peak, the Dutch ‘Boycott Outspan Action’ (BOA) was 
supported by hundreds of anti-Apartheid and Third World 
groups, radical Churches and political organizations in the 
Netherlands, as well as by a number of journalists, artists and 
other public figures. To expand its reach beyond politically 
involved student circles, BOA activists disseminated 
information material through the growing network of ‘Third 
World Shops’. According to du Plessis, Third World Shops 
worked closely with local anti-Apartheid groups.28 The fact that 
some shops sold fairly traded coffee from Guatemala and 
supported a boycott of South African produce shows that Dutch 
activists drew on a wide range of tactics to campaign for 
greater equity in international trade.  
The first coordinated protests by anti-Apartheid activists in 
West Germany took place in autumn 1974. Like their Dutch 
colleagues, members of the AAB responded to the Outspan 
Girls tour in their country with a series of protests, which 
evolved into a broader boycott movement against all fruit and 
vegetables from South Africa. After a long discussion, the 
AAB decided to use a controversial BOA poster, which had led 
to a legal dispute in the Netherlands (see image 1).29 The image 
of a white hand squeezing the head of a Black South African 
boy like an orange implies a clear distinction between white 
perpetrators of violence and Black victims. The armed struggle 
of the ANC and the ‘Pan Africanist Congress’ (PAC) did not fit 
into this picture and was not mentioned.  
[PLACE IMAGE 1 HERE] 
Image 1: ‘Don’t eat Outspan Oranges/Don’t squeeze South-Africans’ 
(PA2.132). Source: archiv für alternatives schrifttum (afas).  
With the ‘Evangelische Frauenarbeit in Deutschland’ 
[Protestant Women’s Work in Germany], the AAB managed to 
win an important ally in 1977. Soon there were groups across 
the country who handed out flyers, put up information stalls, 
provided information about alternative consumer choices and 
wrote letters and petitions. The protest activities organised by 
the members of Protestant Women’s Work, which met with 
considerable resistance in Christian circles, are now considered 
the most successful anti-Apartheid campaign in West 
Germany.30 Although it did not stop German supermarkets 
from importing fruit and other products from South Africa, the 
fact that South African companies responded to these activities 
with labelling systems that obfuscated the origin of their 
produce was interpreted as an indicator of the success of the 
campaign.31  
The actual magnitude of the economic threat that the boycott 
campaign posed to South African companies and their West 
German trading partners is difficult to assess. After a decline in 
the early 1980s, citrus fruit exports from South Africa ‘grew 
impressively by 5,3 per cent per annum’ in the second half of 
the decade,32 and West Germany was one of the biggest 
importers of South African citrus fruit.33 Rather than making 
the substantial concessions that activists in South Africa and 
West Germany demanded, South African companies responded 
with creative measures designed to hide the origin of their 
agricultural produce. Asparagus from South Africa was 
rebranded as ‘Bethlehem Export’, and South African orange 
jam was vaguely labelled ‘foreign produce’.34 According to 
Luders, the targeted companies can be classified as 
‘vacillators’. ‘Without the choice of low-cost compromise, but 
desiring a means to end disruptions’, vacillators ‘lack an 
optimal response’.35 As a result, companies waver between 
repression and nominal confessions, engage in dilatory tactics, 
or try to outmanoeuver their opponents and other stake holders. 
By obfuscating the origin of produce that were the subject of 
boycotts, South African agricultural producers and their 
German trading partners pursued the latter strategy.       
In the light of these developments, some protesters promoted a 
more confrontational approach. On 31 October 1987, members 
of the armed leftist network ‘Revolutionäre Zellen’ 
(Revolutionary Cells, RC)36 carried out an arson attack against 
a branch of the German food store chain REWE in Wesel, 
which destroyed seven road trains causing substantial property 
damage. According to the RC, the fruit and vegetables from 
South Africa sold at REWE and other supermarkets were the 
products of capitalist, racist and sexist oppression in the South 
African Apartheid regime.37 The group claimed that ‘half-
hearted sanctions’ and ‘powerfully eloquent speeches’ were not 
enough to challenge the Apartheid regime and called for more 
solidarity with the armed struggles against racist oppression in 
Southern Africa.38 The attack against REWE received 
surprisingly little media attention. One of the few articles where 
it is mentioned argued ‘this attack by fanatics’ had done more 
harm than good to the anti-Apartheid movement.39  
Radical and violent protest against trading relations with the 
South African Apartheid movement was not limited to boycott 
campaigns against Outspan oranges and other agricultural 
products. In 1985 and 1986, the Dutch group ‘Revolutionary 
Antiracist Action (RaRa) carried out a series of arson attacks 
against stores of the chain Makro and Shell petrol stations.40 
RaRa accused both companies of trading with the Apartheid 
regime and of benefiting from slave labour in South Africa.41 
The following years saw repeated attacks against Shell petrol 
stations by militant anti-Apartheid groups in the Netherlands, 
Scandinavia, and West Germany.42 Soon after the first RaRa 
attack against a Makro store in September 1985, members of 
the RC carried out a series of similar attacks in the FRG. 
During the night of 13/14 October 1985, the group tried to blow 
up a power transmission tower at the industrial plant 
Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen AG and planted a bomb at 
Daimler Benz factory in Schwäbisch-Gmünd. The RC claimed 
that the two companies were selling utility vehicles to the South 
African military and benefited from the exploitation of Black 
South African workers in a production site in Pretoria. In their 
claim of responsibility, the group declared that the support of 
‘British, American and West German imperialists’ were 
responsible for ‘the crimes of the Pretorian racists’.43 Although 
the international protest campaign against Shell was discussed 
at a AAB members’ meeting in November 1987, the minutes 
suggest that the RC attacks were not mentioned at this 
gathering, and there was no public debate on the use of violent 
tactics in the West German anti-Apartheid movement.44       
Although Daimler Benz was not the only German car 
manufacturer with a large production site in South Africa, it 
became a key target for the West German anti-Apartheid 
movement in the mid-1980s.45 At that point many foreign 
companies had left South Africa due to the growing 
international pressure, but Daimler Benz was expanding its 
business operations. Since the car make was extremely popular 
among wealthy white South Africans,46 and the company 
supplied the South African police and military forces with 
vehicles, activists in West Germany argued that the iconic 
Mercedes star had become ‘a symbol of oppression’ (see Image 
2).  
[PLACE IMAGE 2 HERE] 
Image 2: ‘There are signs that become symbols. In South Africa: for 
oppression’ (PA2.40). Source: archiv für alternatives schrifttum (afas).  
Less than two months after the attack against the Daimler Benz 
factory in Schwäbisch-Gmünd the RC struck again. This time, 
the group attacked the companies Mercedes Lueg in Bochum-
Wattenscheidt and Brüggemann und Brandt in Wengern, 
because anti-Apartheid activists had revealed that both sold 
military equipment to the South African Army. While the 
members of the RC acknowledged that Church groups had been 
successful in making racism in South Africa a political issue, 
the group criticised that their actions lacked a radical 
perspective. In their view, expressions of solidarity had to go 
beyond kind words and calls for higher moral standards in trade 
relations between South Africa and West Germany. The RC 
dismissed calls for ‘fair trading policies’, and claimed that it 
was necessary to attack ‘imperialist structures of oppression’ in 
South Africa and in West Germany.47 In January 1986, the 
group carried out another attack against Daimler Benz, this 
time against a branch in Wuppertal, and repeated its criticism 
of the company’s investment in and trade with South Africa. 
In the same year, the production sites of Mercedes Benz South 
Africa were affected by mass strikes. In the period from 
January to August 1986 alone, the Mercedes car factory in East 
London lost fifty-three work days due to industrial action.48 A 
strike for a higher minimum hourly rate in 1987, to which 
Daimler Benz had responded with mass dismissals and other 
repressive measures, resulted in 270 Million DM loss for the 
company and was described as the most expensive strike in the 
South African history.49    
Due to the combined effect of physical attacks against company 
branches in Germany, the mass strikes at South African 
production sites, the growing reputational threat, and a 
recession in the mid-1980s, Daimler Benz, Siemens and other 
German companies with trading links to the Apartheid regime 
were under intense pressure. However, rather than making the 
costly concessions that activists demanded from them, the 
targeted companies responded to this pressure with ‘prosocial 
claims’. Mary-Hunter Mc Donnell and Brayden King define 
prosocial claims as ‘public claims of corporate social actions’ 
that ‘extend beyond the mere transactional interests of the firm 
to provide social benefits to a firm’s constituents or to address 
general social problems’.50 In a joint declaration, leading 
German companies with business links with South Africa 
emphasised that they were playing an important role in the 
‘peaceful struggle’ against the Apartheid regime by investing in 
the future of South Africa and by helping to improve the 
working and living conditions of the Black population.51 
Daimler Benz was particularly keen to stress its commitment to 
peaceful political change in South Africa. A number of public 
statements from the late 1980s emphasise the company’s 
commitment to racial equality and its exemplary and successful 
effort to train and support Black employees.52 Up until now, the 
Mercedes-Benz South Africa group prides itself on being a 
‘responsible corporate citizen of the South African automotive 
industry’.53 Although the violent anti-Apartheid protest in West 
Germany caused substantial property damage, it received so 
little media attention that the targeted companies did not feel 
compelled to comment on the attacks in public and tried to 
neutralize the reputational threat with prosocial claims. As the 
case of the German clothing chain Adler shows, this is not an 
option for companies if radical and violent protest activities 
receive a great deal of media attention.      
A feminist solidarity campaign for women workers in South 
Korea 
On 4 May 1986, the Korean Women’s Group in West Berlin 
received a letter that caused great concern among its members. 
It included a report in which trade unionists described the poor 
working conditions in the garment factory Flair Fashion, in Iri, 
South Korea (a Free Trade Zone 250 km from Seoul).54 The 
factory produced clothes that the German company Adler sold 
at cheap prices to customers in West Germany and other 
European countries. Founded in 1959, Adler had initially 
produced its entire stock in Germany, but then outsourced a 
growing part of its production to Asia. In 1978, Adler opened a 
garment factory in Iri to benefit from the relatively low labour 
costs and the financial benefits of the South Korean Free Trade 
Zone. By 1986, 60 to 80 per cent of the clothes that Adler sold 
in its European stores were ‘made in Korea’.55 Adler defended 
its substantial investment in South Korea with prosocial claims. 
According to the German management, Flair Fashion was a 
‘model factory’.56 They claimed that wages were 10 to 15 per 
cent higher than in Japanese and American- owned factories in 
the Free Trade Zone and that Flair Fashion provided free 
accommodation to 300 employees, plus a tennis court and a 
range of other facilities.57 Trade unionists, however, criticised 
the working conditions at Flair Fashion as ‘inhumane’.  
In their letter to the Korean Women’s Group in Berlin, workers 
reported that they were expected to do at least one hour of 
overtime per day whilst receiving salaries below the minimum 
wage.58 The management constantly monitored the employees 
and punished them for mistakes. According to the authors of 
the letter, many workers could meet the required output only by 
foregoing breaks and exhausting themselves beyond their 
limits. They added that the German management at Flair 
Fashion treated the Korean workers with disrespect.59  
The authors of the letter were particularly concerned about the 
situation of female employees at Flair Fashion. Since the 
1960s, women’s involvement in the South Korean labour 
market had grown constantly. By the late 1980s, it had come 
close to 50 per cent.60 For the most part, women worked as 
unskilled labourers in low paid occupations. In 1987, ‘the 
majority of women workers (56.1 per cent) were employed in 
only three out of 27 manufacturing industries [wearing apparel, 
textiles and electronics], all key export industries’.61 Women 
constituted more than 70 per cent of the workers at South 
Korean clothing manufacturers.62 At Flair Fashion, the ratio of 
female employees was even higher than in other garment 
factories in South Korea. For the most part, female employees 
were unskilled workers of 17 to 25 years of age. As in other 
garment factories, women’s wages at Flair Fashion were 
considerably lower than those of their male colleagues. On 
average, female workers earned 40 to 50 per cent less than men 
in the same positions.63 And, unlike male employees, not all 
women workers were insured against industrial accidents: 
female employees could claim compensation from the Korean 
insurance system only if they were under twenty-five. At this 
age, they were expected to leave the workforce to dedicate 
themselves fully to marriage and motherhood.64  
According to Jai Sin Pak, a member of the Korean Women’s 
Group in Berlin, Confucian gender norms imposed a strongly 
subordinate position on women in Korea under which girls and 
unmarried women were under the authority of male relatives, 
while married women must submit to their husbands.65 The 
increasing participation of women in the Korean labour market 
did not, at least initially, challenge traditional gender norms. In 
fact, Adler and other foreign investors benefited from the low 
wages and docile demeanour of female workers. Fürchtegott 
Adler, the head of Flair Fashion, openly admitted this fact in an 
internal publication in 1984: ‘The rapid rise of the ADLER 
company’, declared Adler, ‘was possible only because of the 
black-haired, almond-eyed Korean women’. He added that, to 
his regret, he lost most of his employees at the age of twenty-
five, because the Flair Fashion ‘girls’ wanted to ‘spoil their 
men and dedicate themselves fully to family and household’.66 
Compounding the discrimination experienced by female 
employees at Flair Fashion as women in the South Korean 
labour market, trade unionists claimed that sexual assault by the 
management was commonplace at the factory. The letter-
writers did not refer to concrete cases, but they left no doubt 
that a sexual relationship with a German manager was the only 
way for women to be promoted to overseer or shift leader.67 
The workers saw no way to solve their problems internally, as 
the German management prohibited general assemblies and 
refused to discuss employment issues with democratically 
elected trade union activists. In view of these circumstances, a 
group of unionists decided to go public. In their letter to the 
Korean Women’s Group in West Berlin, the women described 
the problems at Flair Fashion and appealed for ‘sisterly help’ 
from Germany.68  
The plea for help from South Korea sparked a thriving 
solidarity campaign in West Germany that involved groups 
across the political spectrum. The Korean Women’s Group in 
Berlin and ‘Terre des Femmes’ (TdF)69 activists were the first 
to respond, with a public relations campaign that mobilised a 
range of other groups including feminist groups, Christian 
organizations, radical leftist groups, trade unions and Third 
World activists. According to the union activist Esther 
Dischereit, the motives and political backgrounds of the actors 
involved varied considerably, but the decentralised and non-
hierarchical nature of the campaign allowed all groups to 
express solidarity with the Korean workers in their own ways.70 
While TdF activists sought dialogue with the Adler 
management and tried to gather and publicise information 
about the situation on the ground, other groups staged sit-in 
blockades and other protests at local Adler branches. With a 
few exceptions, the groups involved drew on explicitly non-
violent means to campaign for better working conditions at 
Flair Fashion.    
On 21 June, members of the militant feminist group ‘Red 
Zora’71 planted a bomb at the Adler headquarters in Haibach, 
which failed to explode. In the claim of responsibility, the 
group declared that it had carried out the attack to support the 
South Korean Adler employees in their struggle for better 
working conditions. The group acknowledged that Adler’s 
favourable prices allowed even people on benefits to feel part 
of consumer society, but the warned that consumption and 
other privileges ‘are based on the exploitation, and destruction 
of the people in the Third World’. The failed bombing marked 
the beginning of a series of attacks against Adler premises in 
Germany. In August, the RZ claimed responsibility for nine 
arson attacks against Adler stores in the North-west of the 
country (making ten attacks in total). According to one former 
member, the Red Zora understood the attacks against Adler as a 
form of ‘armed propaganda’ [bewaffnete Propaganda] for the 
cause of the South Korean workers, acts with which the group 
wanted to spark a discussion in Germany and to intensify the 
dialogue between women in Germany and in South Korea.72 
The fires and the sprinkler systems that they activated caused 
substantial property damage. According to Adler management, 
the loss to the company amounted to 30-35 million DM.73 In 
September 1987, the ‘Amazons’, a militant feminist group from 
West Berlin carried out an eleventh attack against Adler. The 
leftist newspaper die tageszeitung reported that, a few weeks 
later, a twelfth attack was thwarted by pure chance.74  
Prior to the series of attacks against its premises, Adler had 
responded to the protest movement in a very similar manner to 
Daimler Benz and other vacillators discussed in the first case 
study: with a mix of prosocial claims, protracted negotiations, 
repression, and minor concessions. The attacks against Adler 
premises in West Germany, however, had caused substantial 
economic damage and were attracting so much media attention 
that it was difficult for the company to ignore them. Against 
this background, the Adler management made a surprising turn-
around. A representative of the company declared that Adler 
had decided to accept the wage increase, to reemploy the 
dismissed union activists and to meet other demands of their 
South Korean employees in order to prevent further attacks.75 
This unexpected decision provoked a range of responses in the 
solidarity campaign, from celebratory enthusiasm to grave 
concern. TdF welcomed the concessions from Adler, but at the 
same time published an open letter criticising the company for 
making the right decision for the wrong reasons.76  
An article by feminist activist and scholar Christa Wichterich 
argued that the militant protest against Adler imperilled the 
success of the broader solidarity campaign. While endorsing 
tactical diversity, she criticized ‘voluntaristic actions that 
jeopardize other forms of resistance’.77  According to her, 
notwithstanding the apparent victory, the arson attacks by the 
Red Zora and the Amazons posed a risk to the broader aims of 
the solidarity campaign. ‘This firework’, claimed Wichterich, 
‘was a disservice to the attempt to use a single protest 
campaign to create a triangle of solidarity between workers in 
the Third World and consumers and workers here.’78 Other 
activists criticised this position as ‘naïve’ and divisive. A 
feminist group from Reutlingen argued that the Red Zora had 
made an important contribution to the campaign’s overall 
success. In their view, the arson attacks had caused significant 
economic harm to Adler and thereby helped to increase the 
pressure on the company. The group claimed: ‘Radical 
resistance on all levels is necessary if we want to put our ideas 
of a non-hierarchical, non-sexist, non-racist society into 
practice.’79 Other activists shared the enthusiasm about Adler’s 
climb-down and congratulated the ‘Red Zora and her sisters’ 
for ‘the brilliant action’.80  
Less than a year after improving the working conditions of its 
South Korean employees, German newspapers reported that 
Adler was planning to relocate its production to other low-wage 
countries.81 There were also reports that Adler tried to prevent 
industrial disputes at a production site in Sri Lanka by hiring 
security staff who could handle guns.82 The company did not 
comment on these reports. According to Luders, Adler can be 
classified as a ‘mobile vacillator’, that is a company that can 
‘pursue exit as an option by relocating their business 
operations’.83 Given the public interest in the situation of the 
Flair Fashion workers, it is remarkable that Adler managed to 
relocate its business operations without attracting major media 
attention. Although the working conditions in the Adler factory 
in Sri Lanka might have been as poor as in the production site 
in South Korea, there were no further major protests against 
Adler. As a result, the company was able to continue its rapid 
expansion course in Western Europe by selling clothes that 
were produced in the Global South – even if they were no 
longer made in Korea.84  
Against this background, it is interesting that in 2010 Adler 
became the first retail store in Germany to sell fair trade clothes 
on a continuous basis.85 Adler now releases an annual 
sustainability report in which it presents itself as a champion of 
the interests of suppliers, consumers and other stakeholders. 
Similar to Daimler Benz, Adler emphasises its continuous 
commitment to humane working conditions and community 
engagement in the Global South. Adler’s social engagement 
activities focus on ‘Bangladesh and India, where it produces the 
majority of its merchandise’, and include the support of a 
Catholic school in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and of the development 
organization Meena.86 Like Mercedes Benz South Africa, Adler 
presents corporate social responsibility as a red thread running 
through its corporate history, omitting information regarding 
industrial disputes at production sites, transnational protest 
movements, and violent attacks against company premises.    
Conclusions 
In the 1980s, the fair trade movement in West Germany 
gathered momentum and offered consumers the possibility to 
buy ethically produced and traded produce like coffee, 
chocolate, tea, and spices. However, in this period ethical 
consumerism was only one of many strategies to fight for better 
working and living conditions for workers in the Global South. 
Taking up Frank Trentmann’s suggestion of widening the 
historical frame in which we analyse the fair trade movement, 
this article has examined the role of violent tactics in two 
transnational solidarity campaigns in the 1980s: a campaign for 
women workers in a South Korean garment factory and the 
German anti-Apartheid movement. Both campaigns were 
characterised by a complex interplay of peaceful and militant 
tactics ranging from information stalls and boycott calls to 
arson attacks. Previous research suggests that the ways in 
which companies respond to protest movements ‘depends to a 
large degree on the extent to which activists are able to 
mobilize the media’.87 While Bradley King has shown that 
boycotts are more likely to exert influence when they attract a 
great deal of media attention,88 the role of violent protest in this 
context has to date had little investigation.  
As the case of the protest campaign against the German 
clothing chain Adler illustrates, the use of violent tactics can 
increase the economic pressure on a company and has the 
potential to attract considerable media attention. However, it 
also demonstrates that it can give targeted companies the option 
to present concessions as a response to the threat of violence 
rather than as necessary adjustments of their corporate practice. 
For this and other reasons, the arson attacks by the militant 
feminist group Red Zora met with strong criticism among 
activists in the solidarity campaign even though it is likely that 
they have contributed to achieving the campaign’s aims. The 
fact that there was open support for the attacks against Adler in 
some parts of the movement shows that there was no consensus 
when it comes to the question of legitimate and necessary 
protest tactics in the struggle for better working and living 
conditions in the Global South. 
Although violent protest in the West German anti-Apartheid 
movement involved similar tactics (arson attacks, bombings, 
and other attacks against property) as in the campaign against 
Adler, it had a different impact. The series of attacks against 
REWE, Daimler Benz and other German companies with 
trading links with South Africa by the militant leftist network 
Revolutionary Cells received hardly any media attention, and 
there were no public comments on the attacks by members of 
the German anti-Apartheid movement or representatives of the 
targeted companies. Since the AAB’s formation in 1974, there 
had been different opinions on the use of violent protest tactics 
in the anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa. Even though 
some AAB members were working closely with members of 
the ANC and other organizations who supported an armed 
struggle against the Apartheid regime, the AAB campaigns 
reinforced a clear, dichotomous distinction between white 
perpetrators and black victims.  
Daimler Benz chose not to comment on the attacks against its 
premises, even though they have probably caused substantial 
economic damage. Unlike Adler, Daimler was no mobile 
vacillator. In 1985, Daimler-Benz AG had acquired 50.1 per 
cent of the shares in United Car and Diesel Distributors in 
South Africa and had changed the company’s name to 
Mercedes Benz of South Africa.89 A relocation of its business 
operations shortly after this acquisition would have involved 
major economic losses and could have resulted in severe 
reputational damage for the company. To avoid this scenario, 
Daimler Benz responded with a mix of repressive measures, 
minor concessions, and prosocial claims.  
The attacks against its premises in Germany did not change the 
fact that Siemens was able to portray itself as a force for good 
in South Africa in the public. The company benefitted not only 
from the lack of media interest in militant protest against its 
corporate practices but also from the anti-communist and 
business-friendly attitude of political leaders in West Germany. 
The coalition government led by the conservative Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl did not want to threaten the business links with 
South Africa and promoted a ‘critical dialogue’ with the 
Apartheid regime.90 While some diplomats and politicians 
made careful attempts to create a dialogue with union 
representatives, civic organizations, and civil rights groups in 
South Africa, others regarded the ANC as a socialist threat to 
the political stability in South Africa. The Minister President of 
Bavaria Franz Josef Strauss openly supported the Apartheid 
regime and dismissed its opponents as a bunch of ‘bomb 
planters and terrorists’.91 Against this background, it is hardly 
surprising that the AAB failed to achieve its aim to end of all 
forms of collaboration between Germany and the racist regime 
in South Africa. Although more research on the role and impact 
of violent protest in solidarity campaigns with workers in the 
Global South is needed, the case studies discussed in this article 
suggest that the use of violent protest tactics can contribute 
towards achieving the aims of such campaigns if, and only if, it 
attracts considerable media attention, the cumulative disruption 
costs clearly exceed the concession costs, and the targeted 
companies face significant social and political pressure.     
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